The future of historical geography within the larger discipline of geography seems to some, once again, problematic. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, geographers have accentuated applied and practical pursuits as well as theoretical and policy-oriented studies. Despite more than thirty years of impressive scholarship and a moment in the limelight in the late 1970s when geographers took stock after the mid-century positivistic binge, historical geographers have found themselves increasingly marginalized in the discipline. Younger historical geographers have often had to hitch their historical proclivities to social theory, environmental topics, or cultural analysis in order to find academic employment. Only four years ago, Cole Harris observed that the “disciplinary landscape is being recalibrated. . . . What seems to be happening, at least in North America, is that history is becoming more geographical and that geography is slowly relinquishing the past.”¹ He concluded that even if new institutional arrangements evolved in the future, what was important was that outstanding humanistic, historical geographical scholarship continue, whatever its disciplinary home. Later I wish to return to his conclusion.

Harris made this observation as part of his commentary at the session of the 1998 Association of American Geographers meetings, marking the publication of Volume III of D.W. Meinig’s superb American historical geography, *The Shaping of America.*² He noted the paradox that *The Shaping of America* “is one of the most geographical works that any North American geographer could possible write.... And yet ... it finds a modest geographical reception.”³ Comparing Meinig’s reception to a similarly cool one for Carl Sauer’s later work, Harris concluded that both suffered from the same disciplinary problems of “too much of the past, too much of topics that too few geographers know anything about.”⁴ Today we gather to celebrate a geographer, who in the grand tradition of Sauer, Meinig,

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perhaps James Lemon, and the ambitions at least of Ralph Brown, has the
temerity to launch his own interpretation of the geography of America’s past.\textsuperscript{5} With the publication of \textit{The American Way: A Geographical History of Crisis and Recovery}, Carville Earle has advanced a bold, complicated, and sweeping account of America’s changing historical geography from the moment of initial colonization to the end of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{6} But, in addition to that, Earle has, as indicated by the subtitle of \textit{A Geographical History of Crisis and Recovery}, broadened the view to offer a geographical perspective on the grand sweep of American history. In short, this is what he means by a geographical history, rather than an historical geography. This approach to the past ensures an interested audience of historians of various subdisciplinary bents. Curiously, however, despite an empirically rich, and at times dense, history, one that squarely focuses on the past—as Harris wrote “too much of the past, too much of topics that too few geographers know anything about”—\textit{The American Way}, will in time, I predict, attract a larger geographical audience than Meinig’s \textit{magnum opus} has. Not only does Earle include the neoconservative Republican years of our present era in his macrohistorical geography (his words), but he also challenges theoretical perspectives, especially liberal and Marxist ones, as inadequate for explaining American geographies, much less American economic and social history. Thus, for example, he disagrees with most contemporary economic geographers that post-Fordist economic impulses repudiate Weberian locational theory. Quite the reverse, Earle believes they are actually Weberian in searching for lower-cost solutions.\textsuperscript{7} My point is that Earle’s incorporation of the present, use of theory, challenge to orthodoxy, and argument for a grand political economy will invite the engagement of many geographers. The positing of periodic crises and policy regime changes will attract attention despite the historical context. This is precisely what Earle would wish—to synthesize, illuminate, and provoke.

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\textit{The American Way} is an ambitious intellectual enterprise. Earle presents a complicated story, for which I will rehearse only a thin version. To play on Earle’s evaluation of the commentary on Meinig’s \textit{The Shaping of America}, in which he wrote “the acclaim is more effusive than critical,” I will say at the outset that I also intend to be more effusive than critical.\textsuperscript{8} Reaching back to the early 1600s, Earle identifies eight periods of political economy; that is, regimes of ideology and policy, each of which dominated roughly fifty-year periods. Each regime emerged in response to an economic and social crisis “endemic to a capitalist market economy.” Then there followed years of creative response, innovation, diffusion, conflict and dissent, and finally decline into a new crisis. What is remarkable, Earle argues, were the striking similarities in philosophy and policies among
specific types of regimes. For each regime type, he identifies broad domestic and international policy orientations based on underlying philosophies. Thus, during the colonial era, two English Republican regimes stressed mercantilistic, protectionist policies that were nationalist in tenor for international affairs, while espousing domestic policies oriented toward a “broadening of economic and social opportunities” for mass egalitarian goals. Sandwiched between these two English Republican regimes were two liberal ones (one from the 1630s to the 1680s and the other from the 1730s to the 1780s), which based their policies on a belief in “liberty, property, and greater freedom of trade.” This type of regime favored individualism, entrepreneurialism, private property rights, and internationalist free trade, which had the effect of reinforcing the advantages of established elites.10

When the second regime of English liberalism ended in the spasm of the Revolutionary War in America and the establishment of the new nation, America’s founding fathers rearranged the principal philosophical strategies into new combinations that, while running periodically into state-threatening crises, nonetheless have allowed the nation to survive for more than two centuries. Instead of carrying forward Anglo policy formulations, the new combinations, Earle states, constituted the American Way. Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James Madison, and the other Federalists basically combined the earlier English liberals’ embrace of individualism and private property with English Republicanism’s nationalist, protectionist strategies.11 Three times this combination of elite and protectionist policies, which Earle names Republics, dominated American regimes—the First Republic from the 1780s to the 1820s, the Second Republic from the 1880s to the 1920s, and the Third Republic from the 1980s to the present. Even to the most casual observer, there is a familiarity to these regime periods. Although most may not readily recognize the strategies and policies of the First Republic as it struggled to put the new nation on sound footing, we surely recognize the similarities, often noted by pundits and journalists, between the turn-of-the-century, Gilded Age America of John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Theodore Roosevelt and today’s era of neoconservative (Reagan) Republicanism.

The strategists of the Republics analyzed the economic crises, out of which their new regimes emerged, as the result of failures in production. Their policies—favoring property, entrepreneurialism, and protectionism—encouraged new configurations of production, which we recognize as the First Industrial Revolution in early America, the Second Industrial Revolution in the late-nineteenth century, and the post-Fordist or postindustrial economy we now experience. The enormous economic success of these regimes produced dramatic inequalities of wealth (sound familiar) and eventually economic and social crises of their own, which required and inspired a new policy regime (and many today also see such a storm gathering on the distant horizon).
Earle calls these new regimes that formed in response to the Republic’s crises, Democracies. The initial Democracy—or Jacksonian Democracy—followed the First Republic, and the New Deal after the final excesses of the “Age of Business” constituted the Second Democracy. The politicians and strategists of these Democracies saw the crises of the 1830s and 1930s flowing from problems of consumption, viewed either as under consumption or overproduction depending on one’s perspective. They adopted egalitarian goals and constructed policies aimed at expanding demand by increasing the opportunities of the masses and encouraging free trade. As a result, wealth inequalities diminished during the Democracies. Earle notes that his five regime periods since the Revolution nicely fit with the periodization that historians commonly use to carve up the nation’s past. Moreover, he appropriately supports them with historical evidence such as long wave cycles of commodity prices and curves of innovation and diffusion.

Just as you think you have mastered the changing arrangement of domestic and foreign policies that made up the colonial era and the American regimes, Earle tackles the heart of the matter for geographers. Each type of policy regime had accompanying, predictable geographical structures; and therefore, each shift in regime meant a wrenching change in economic and social geographies at the national, regional, and local scales. New political regimes unleashed new, for their era at least, economic and social impulses that in turn sparked commensurate geographies along four spatial dimensions in Earle’s analysis. American Republics with their protectionist and elitist proclivities encouraged spatial expansion at the periphery, while promoting demographic consolidation at the core. At the same time, these Republics fostered regional specialization and regional stability. In contrast, the Democracies of egalitarian and internationalist policies reversed these spatial outcomes, resulting in consolidation at the periphery, demographic dispersion of the core, regional diversification, and ultimately regional volatility.

If trying to control the two policy regimes with the four spatial corollaries, along with the Anglo and American flip-flop, were not enough, Earle adds another geographical outcome to complicate the picture. This complication is essential for his story. At three times in the past as the Republic regimes responded to the regional conflicts of the preceding Democracies’ crises, the American state was enlarged. That is, “these enlargements were pursuant to certain redefinitions in the fundamental rights of American citizens and [geographically] to the expanded jurisdiction of the state.” The enlargements occurred first at the end of the Revolution with a shift in power from province to section (the section being a coalition of states). Then, the second one occurred after the Civil War toward the end of the nineteenth century with a shift from section to nation as a
result of the increased power of the federal government, and finally the third shift took place after the crises of the 1960s with an enlargement from nation to a transnational orientation. In Earle's words, liberally quoted, "the function of these enlargements is ... to eliminate the existing territorial constraints of a zero-sum game and thereby expand the range of American economic and political opportunity.... [T]hese periodic enlargements ... a ratcheting of American power to ascending scales ... may be the most important for social continuity." Note that these spatial increases occurred approximately every 100 years at the end of the three centuries. Does this imply that a fourth enlargement will be necessary at the end of this century and therefore, we should aggressively support NASA's space programs?

*The American Way* is far more than a theoretical or abstract interpretation of the nation’s political economy and its macro-historical geography. Earle, as we have grown to expect over the years, uses a vast array of evidence—discursive, tabular, graphic, and cartographic—to argue his position. Just as the policy regimes are embedded in a vast consumption of historical literature, the empirical case for each regime and its geography reveals a similarly rich exploration of sources and imaginative manipulation of data. A lifetime of learning is on display from the succinct, instructive, and data-rich description of colonial America’s origins and development to late-twentieth century evidence of the emerging transnational state. For a sense of this awesome empirical presentation, consider as only a sampling his marshaling of information, often temporally and spatially, on population settlement, population concentration and potential, manufacturing employment, income per capita, income inequalities, various measures of urbanization, government expenditures by regional share and levels of government, home ownership rates, presidential elections, party control of Congress, and specific legislative votes, political openness indices, the use of U.S. armed forces abroad, or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) vote.

As I read further into the book, I increasingly wished to see the argument playing out at local scales that are closer to what one might call the landscape. Of course, Earle anticipated such a concern and provided an interpretation of the policy regimes’ and periodization’s ramifications for the nation’s unfolding urban geography. Here, he examines both the spatial system of cities and the internal geographical structuring of urban areas. He finds “that American urban geographies are cyclical rather than linear in their evolution and ... they alternate in conjunction with national policy regimes.” Elitist, protectionist Republicans with strategies to enhance production “heaped the cumulative advantage of increasing returns on the nation’s urban system.” In short, the system of cities was stable in overall structure. At the same time, the Republic regimes “thrust the new production sites (consistent with their strategy to stimulate production) into the suburbs on the outskirts of the leading cities...."
would only add that many of these new sites were beyond the suburbs or the outskirts, forming what, for example, Americans in the early twentieth century called “industrial districts” in part because of the lack of obvious spatial relationship to the city and its contiguous suburbs. Links of transportation, industrial production systems, labor, and capital bound these new areas in all three Republics into functional metropolitan regions. However, such a minor amplification, if it was one at all, merely supports Earle’s point.

The Democracies with their egalitarian political propensities and pro-consumer strategies encouraged greater change or instability in the system of cities and centripetal forces within urban areas. Earle writes, “The accessibility of the masses within the city and the provision of adequate housing took precedence over the promotion of laissez-faire suburban expansion.” The macro or regional level of geographical structures that comprise the bulk of Earle’s regime analysis fits nicely with the traditional descriptions and explanations of the system of cities because, of course, cities are an integral part of the unfolding of the national and regional spatial economies. The added value of Earle’s interpretation lies in the cyclical periodization and his measures of system instability during the two Democracies.

Although there is a great deal of resonance in both cycles of centrifugal and centripetal forces that Earle sees at work in the cities’ internal geography, the fit of the regime analysis seems to me to be less comfortable. I see only mixed success in this interpretation of urban spatial structure. When local and national governmental policies directed at urban infrastructure and housing became part of public debates after about 1880, regime periodization gains stronger explanatory power. There was less regime strategy at work in cities in the mid-to-late nineteenth century because the implementation of new technologies was driven by other rationales than those proposed under the First Democracy. Thus, for example, railroads, largely built after 1840, were initially developed for intercity, rather than local travel. Almost accidentally they encouraged both residential and industrial centrifugal, rather than Earle’s anticipated centripetal, outcomes before 1870. New residential suburbs emerged at or after mid-century around former rural train stops well beyond the cities’ contiguously developed area. Seemingly, these new communities were more part of Earle’s Republic urban geographies. The rationale for sewer development during the First Democracy seems to me less concerned with egalitarian, mass impulses than elite concerns over public health emergencies, which created conditions that jeopardized their commercial interests and the health of their own class. Thus, sewers and other urban infrastructure usually came initially in this First Democracy to the commercial heart of the city and to neighborhoods where taxpayers were willing and able to foot the bill of special assessments. Despite patronage priorities and dependence on immigrant and working-class voters, politi-
cal machines neglected immigrant and working-class neighborhoods, which usually had their effluent carried away and their impure water supply treated after the more affluent areas had their needs taken care of.\textsuperscript{21}

If the macro-scale of regime analysis may not fit comfortably in the privately oriented nineteenth-century city, it may have some difficulties neatly encapsulating urban spatial processes in the twentieth century too. Certainly civil rights activism and court decisions, federal housing policies, and even urban renewal in a somewhat perverted sense expressed the Second (1930s - 1970s) Democracy's egalitarian and mass consumption strategies. As Earle writes, the FHA and VHA's expansion of access to mortgage monies for working-class families set the stage for a suburban housing explosion, especially in view of anti-central-city neighborhood rules and regulations that shaped the FHA's redlining maps. At this juncture, however, we detect discomfiting contradictions in a housing policy for the masses, which discriminated among the masses and accordingly differentiated the city's social geography. The contradictions in policy and implementation reflected both antagonism to the regime such as from conservative business interests and from divisions within the regime itself, which involved powerful Southern Democrats in Congress arrayed against northeastern liberals, Midwestern labor unions, and African Americans. Congressional policy architects, New Deal planners, federal bureaucrats entrusted with developing workable rules, and local officials given considerable implementation powers more often than not embraced mainstream values, including the acceptance of racial distinctions. Resulting geographies reflected this fact.

It is not clear to me, for example, what the Second Democracy regime's stance towards integration was. Civil rights advocacy came both from a dissenting group within the regime leadership and from protesters outside of it because the leadership did not adequately embrace racial change. Robert Caro in his recent biography of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate, clearly describes the regime leadership's internal divisions and its efforts to catch up to the social movement getting ahead of them.\textsuperscript{22} Earle does, indeed, point out the disastrous results that exploded—conflict in his paradigm—in the 1960s. My point is not to dispute what happened, but rather to wonder if the macro-model provides adequate explanatory power of the processes leading to spatial patterns so close to the ground.

As part of the Second Democracy, Earle describes the consolidation of the suburbs through the filling-in of the wedges of undeveloped space, which existed between the pre-1930 radials of development along commuter railroad and trolley lines. Here, the automobile allowed large tract developers to exploit these spaces, and soon regional shopping centers and business campuses or parks followed customers and workers to the suburbs. Federal policies such as the housing programs already noted, income tax incentives, favorable depreciation schedules for commercial development, subsidies for expressways, and finally the Interstate High-
way system clearly aided this suburban “land rush,” as Earle aptly terms it. Scholars increasingly argue, however, that the twentieth-century processes resulting in this post-war suburban pattern were well underway in the 1920s before the Second Democracy regime. Geographer Richard Harris and historian William S. Worley among many others have described the emerging automobile, in-fill suburbs of the 1920s, while Robert Fogelson, Richard Longstreth, and geographer Robert Lewis have captured the suburbanization of retailing and manufacturing in the twenties, which had downtown and central city commercial interests worried, rightfully, about their futures.23 Planners in the 1920s were busily retrofitting the nineteenth-century city to the new auto technology, while state and local officials—for example, New York’s Robert Moses or even the Pittsburgh region’s Allegheny County commissioners—undertook large highway building programs to accommodate the automobile beyond the central city.24 None of these observations necessarily refutes the regime model and its importance for understanding the nation’s geographical history. Rather, the intent is to question the power of broad models to capture fully processes and patterns at smaller scales where a complex interplay of forces clouds the picture, disrupting the neat cyclical scheme.

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Those of you in the audience and I both know that Earle will not let my concerns remain afloat for long. He enjoys intellectual argument, and perhaps from that character trait has grown his remarkable scholarly career. In his preface to the 1992 collection of his essays, Earle suggests that growing up in Baltimore in the 1950s—just as movie director Barry Levinson did—may have inspired both his interest in regional cultures and his tendency towards an intellectually based skepticism.25 Nearly 100 years after the Civil War, Baltimore still exuded the contradictions of a border city between the North and the South. While director Levinson explored through a series of exceptional movies life in his town during the middle third of the twentieth century, Earle turned to history and geography for his understanding of the conflicting regional cultures he experienced. To his surprise as a city-bred boy, he found the roots of this sectional conflict in rural life, agrarian economies and ecologies, and regional development. Baltimore’s irrepresible—perhaps favorite—son H.L. Mencken, would not have been surprised, for more than once he charged that Baltimore suffered over the years from Maryland’s “barnyard government,” the rural-dominated state legislature.26 But if Mencken had failed to instruct this young Baltimorean in the importance of rural Maryland for understanding his native city, he had infused the budding scholar with, in Earle’s words, “a healthy dose of Mencken’s skepticism and iconoclasm . . . for his thoughts and his style were all around you, in the vapors so to speak.”27 In his newspaper columns, the pages of the American Mercury
magazine, and his numerous books, Mencken urged Americans to be skeptical of conventional wisdom. Earle learned this lesson well from the Sage of Baltimore. Beginning with his dissertation on colonial Maryland’s All Hallow’s Parish, he has challenged and then questioned accepted historical interpretations. He progressively expanded his vision in space and time, but always with the foundation of agrarian economies, labor requirements, and rural ecologies informing the perspective. While some of us narrowed our spatial vision, Earle enlarged his from the parish to the region or section and eventually to the nation because, as he has observed, he wished to connect the prosaic agrarian details to the larger issues of economy, society, and polity. Thus, it should not really be a surprise for a scholar once associated with research on colonial rural society and later the antebellum slavery and staple South to be also writing on American labor, the geography of strikes, and the failure of American Socialism. For Earle, discoveries about one set of historical problems led to questions about other historical problems.

Despite working closely at times with historians, he could not leave history to the historians. In this, he reminds me of the once popular, mid-twentieth-century novelist John O’Hara, who claimed to be a social historian of American manners and mores because he could not entrust such important grounds to professional historians. Earle’s quest for nearly thirty years to bring the geographical perspective to bear on the American past reminds us that the understanding, the writing, of history is enriched by a variety of perspectives and sources including, but not limited to, art, architecture, literature, photography, science, music, biography, anthropology, archaeology, and, of course, geography. The spatial method, at its simplest, essentially mapping phenomena, sheds “almost magically new light on old problems,” Earle has written. But, the power of the spatial method is only suggestive without what he calls “connective attributes within space and time.” One such connectivity is the “relationship between man and environment—the focal point of ecological inquiry.” Thus, armed with the spatial method and working from the perspective of ecological inquiry, Earle has addressed a number of historiographical issues. In his words, he has been doing geographical history—focusing “upon those relationships which have shaped human affairs in the past.”

In addition to his many contributions to the understanding of specific historical problems and concomitantly of America’s geographical past, Earle has advanced the profile of historical geography through institution building and sustained argument in the larger enterprise of interpreting America’s history. Some aspects of the nation’s past such as the settlement of the West have demanded attention to fundamentally geographical factors by all who addressed them. With notable exceptions, however, American historians have all too frequently overlooked altogether, or oversimplified, the geography inherent in a specific issue. In his 1992 essay collection, aptly titled *Geographical Inquiry and American Historical Problems,*
Earle forcefully presented the case for geographical history. The publication of *The American Way* makes it irresponsible for writers to ignore the significance of geography in the American past. In this, Earle joins a surprisingly small though prestigious number of American geographers who have significantly influenced the study of the past.

Unlike many prolific scholars, Earle has also expended the energy institutionally to preserve and advance the subdiscipline of historical geography in North America. Institutional commitments detract from the time available for scholarly endeavors. His chairmanship of the Department of Geography and Anthropology at Louisiana State University needs no elaboration here, but as a leading institution in the training of historical geographers, this position has been of critical disciplinary importance. Editorships of the Association of American Geographers’ flagship journal, the *Annals*, and the youthful *Historical Geography*, speak for themselves as well. As chair of the AAG Historical Geography Specialty Group in the late 1980s, he explicitly facilitated vital networking that had been missing among this band of independently inclined scholars, and most significantly, he brought to the meetings eminent nongeographers whose work was geographical and seminal. He tried to carry the subdiscipline with him into the engagement with scholarship beyond the borders of the subdisciplinary purview. But, it was in the youthful Social Science History Association that he saw an opportunity for geographers to transcend disciplinary barriers. As editorial board member of the organization’s journal, *Social Science History*, and chair of its historical geography network, he espied the hopeful signs of an impending “rapprochement between history and geography.”

What does such a rapprochement mean for historical geography? In 1992, Earle appropriately observed that while North American historical geographers focus “on those relationships which have shaped the evolution of place and landscape,” many and certainly the most influential ones such as Carl Sauer, D.W. Meinig, and Andrew H. Clark and his students (geographers like Cole Harris, James Lemon, and LSU’s own Sam Hilliard) were also doing geographical history. Consequently, one might ask whether the larger discipline of history will simply absorb geographical history as part of a rearrangement of the intellectual environment of the academy? As I noted at the beginning, Cole Harris believes this might be the case. My own experience of twenty-five years in an intellectually flexible and welcoming history department would suggest the feasibility of this path, but only for a while.

As fruitful and happy as my experience has been, my professional life among historians causes me not to share Harris’ confidence “that the tradition of scholarship exemplified so well by [Meinig’s] *The Shaping of America*,” and I would add *The American Way*, can be maintained outside the confines of academic geography. Harris writes, “I used to think that it could only be nurtured in geography departments, but the environmental
historians have shown that this is not so.”36 Yes, some environmental historians, and those historians currently exploring the concept of public space are stomping all over historical geography’s natural turf and often doing so exceptionally well. I would also add, however, that even though topics like environmental history are geographical, the approaches of historians are not always especially geographical or sensitive to the geography of issues. When these currently fashionable topics fade, as for example labor historians’ interest in working class neighborhoods did after the 1980s, the attention of new, young historians will likely shift from such inherently geographical topics. Who then would continue to research historical geographical problems? Who would train emerging scholars in the geographical perspective if Harris’ absorption or rearrangement occurred? Where could they develop perspectives that historical geographers learned at places like Chicago, Berkeley, Madison, Toronto, and of course Baton Rouge? I have shared Earle’s experience of having a longstanding, historically minded collaborator remark that “you think differently.”37 I have more than once been asked to give a graduate seminar in my department on historical geography, as if that would convey the geographer’s perspective and craft. In Harris’ model, American geography would, I fear, become dependent again on the United Kingdom for historical geographers.

When academic “fashions” change, as they always do, historians will turn to doing less geography or at least less with geographical topics. I believe geography—the larger discipline that is—will, as it has done in the past, rediscover the scholarship of its historically minded colleagues and the significance of an historical perspective. As Earle has shown in his writing and professional life, the distinctions between historical geography and geographical history have been “overdrawn and excessively canonical.”38 While geographical history leads one into engagement with the world of history, and properly so, training in historical geography, including instruction in the use of the sources and familiarity with the literature of history, prepares the new scholar for the broader engagement. I am, therefore, grateful for the commitment to the geographer’s craft that Earle and Louisiana State University have made. The American Way demonstrates the wisdom of that commitment.

Notes

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29. Earle, Geographical Inquiry and American Historical Problems, 8-10.
33. The three scholars were: Allan G. Bogue, G. William Skinner, and Immanuel M. Wallerstein.
34. Earle, Geographical Inquiry and American Historical Problems, 11, 2.
37. Earle, Geographical Inquiry, 5.
38. Earle, Geographical Inquiry, 6.