The City of Three Colors: Segregation in Colonial Dar es Salaam, 1891-1961

Sarah L. Smiley

In southern Dar es Salaam, near Mbagala Ward, there is a market called Soko la Rangi Tatu—the market of three colors. When I lived in Dar es Salaam, I had no reason to shop at Rangi Tatu. I lived in the central part of the city, much closer to other markets. The fact that this market is accessible only by the city’s most rickety buses that travel along some of the city’s most pot-holed streets did not make shopping there any more attractive. My attitude changed one day when a longtime resident of Mbagala shared with me a tale of how the market earned its name. Legend has it that three wealthy landowners used to meet at the market’s present-day location to discuss business. These men, a white European, an Arab, and a black African, are themselves the three colors in the market’s name. I decided to go to Rangi Tatu to learn more about these three men, these three colors. Unfortunately I discovered that, although heartwarming, this tale is pure fiction. According to market vendors and area residents, the market’s name originated from the differently colored roofs of three homes that were once visible from the market. I was not entirely surprised that the story of those three men was false because it did not reflect the Dar es Salaam that I knew. My Dar es Salaam was one with little interaction between races and one where residents have strong ideas about where people belong. As a white American living in the traditionally Asian City Center, I was told by many people that I was out of place. The Dar es Salaam I experienced was Mji wa Rangi Tatu—the city of three colors. To me these three colors are distinct, both in color and in geography, and represent three races in the city: whites, Asians, and Africans. That these colors are separate is a direct legacy of seventy years of segregation, first implemented by the German colonial government and later continued by the British colonial government. Yet these three colors were never equal in terms of population; Dar es Salaam is, and always was, a majority African city. The city’s African population was 90 percent in 1894 and 63 percent in 1957. During that same period, the city’s European population was never more than four percent.

To call colonial Dar es Salaam a racially segregated city is not groundbreaking, since many scholars of the city have already done so. De Blij commented on the de jure racial segregation of Dar es Salaam among European, Asian and Arab, and African areas, and Leslie surveyed the
city’s many suburbs designed exclusively for the African population. Anthony and Mascarenhas both suggested that race served as the primary factor in Dar es Salaam’s segregation, above class, ethnicity, religion, or occupation. Rather, what is unique about Dar es Salaam’s history of segregation is that it diverges from the histories found in other African cities. Home identifies five types of segregation in British colonial cities: segregation as taxonomy, segregation for defense, segregation for health, segregation as trusteeship, and segregation by zoning. Dar es Salaam’s segregation does not entirely fit any of these categories. Unlike South Africa’s cities, it did not contain official zones designated exclusively for white, black, or Indian residents. Unlike most Nigerian cities, it did not explicitly follow the principles of Lord Lugard’s indirect rule (trusteeship), largely since the German government first introduced segregation. Instead racial separation in Dar es Salaam occurred as segregation by building ordinance. Both the German and British colonial governments implemented building ordinances that divided Dar es Salaam into three zones based on the standard of construction allowed within each area. These zones said nothing about the race of each building’s inhabitants but still these ordinances achieved racial segregation.

Building ordinances did appear in other colonial African cities but often alongside policies related to health, sanitation, and disease prevention. Across much of the continent colonial governments sought to protect the health of Europeans by separating them from diseases believed endemic in the African population, such as malaria, yellow fever, and the bubonic plague. Governments used a variety of measures to prevent disease transmission including constructing new European settlements away from African homes and installing a cordon sanitaire, an empty space between European and African areas to limit the range of disease vectors. In these cases the government put the health of the European population first; large scale measures to protect entire cities such as draining mosquito breeding pools were deemed too costly to implement. In some cities the goal of disease prevention went hand in hand with building standards. The French government permitted straw huts only in the Medina, Dakar’s Native Village; this measure attempted to lessen the threat of disease for the European population who lived in separate areas in homes constructed from durable materials. In Zanzibar the British government separated the city into areas of stone houses and areas of native style huts and used building rules to justify the clearing of homes deemed health hazards.

In Dar es Salaam health never played a central role in racial segregation in spite of the fact that Dr. Robert Koch, a Nobel Prize winner, conducted groundbreaking research there on the transmission and treatment of tropical diseases. This inattention to health can be partially attributed to the German government’s 1904/1905 medical report that found malaria was endemic in all areas of Dar es Salaam, including European residential areas. Furthermore the report conceded that efforts to control the disease, such as removing breeding pools and expelling Africans from the European area, would never completely eliminate new infections. As a result
of these realizations, segregation for health concerns was not a central government policy; instead both colonial governments segregated Dar es Salaam based on construction codes. These building ordinances were subtle backdoor policies to segregate the city without an explicit focus on race. They divided Dar es Salaam into zones based solely on the types of buildings allowed in each zone. Zone 1 was for buildings of a European type, Zone 2 was for residential or commercial buildings, and Zone 3 was for native style buildings. These zones were distinct entities but had an important spatial component. Zone 1 occupied the city’s premium land along the coast and was situated as far as possible from Zone 3 while Zone 2 served as a buffer between these areas. Although these ordinances applied only to physical structures, they ultimately dictated the racial composition of these areas. In fact these areas acquired colloquial Swahili names; Zone 1 became known as Uzunguni (the place of Europeans), Zone 2 as Uhindini (the place of Indians), and Zone 3 as Uswahilini (the place of Africans).12

This paper traces Dar es Salaam’s history of segregation in more detail. It first considers the various building ordinances implemented by the German and British colonial governments. It then focuses more closely on the British period, considering the social and physical segregation of the city. It divides the British era into two periods, using the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act as the dividing line. I demonstrate that in spite of any colonial notions of development, the British government maintained and strengthened racial segregation in Dar es Salaam in the absence of any official policy of segregation. This segregation did more than dictate the residential patterns of urban residents; the city was the site of social segregation as the government privileged the minority European population at the expense of the majority African population. Even though this paper is more concerned with the production of segregation in Dar es Salaam rather than its consequences, the end result of over one hundred years of racial segregation is Mji wa Rangi Tatu, a city with little interaction between races but clear notions about spatial belonging.

### Colonial era building ordinances

German rule in German East Africa officially began in 1887, and the government enacted some early forms of segregation before implementing its first building ordinance in 1891.13 During those four years the government seized eastern portions of the city from Africans and expelled them further west.14 The result was a Dar es Salaam of three concentric zones. The central zone housed administrative buildings and residences, the next zone contained Arab farms, and the outermost zone was home to African villages.15 The 1891 building ordinance and its successor merely reinforced these early actions. This first ordinance divided the city into forty-six separate lots. Those lots facing the harbor were allotted to Europeans and only allowed for the construction of sturdy buildings of a European style. The remaining lots, those considered to be the backside of the city, allowed for the construction of other types of buildings as long as they also
were built of sturdy materials. This building ordinance explicitly prohibited the construction of African style huts on any of the forty-six lots. After 1912 the German government began to purchase land for a dedicated African settlement, suggesting that it envisioned more strict segregation for the future.\textsuperscript{16} In 1914 the government expanded the city’s first building ordinance.\textsuperscript{17} The most significant change to the building standards involved the addition of a third zone, which permitted native style buildings; again Zone 1 allowed for European style construction and Zone 2 for mixed construction using only sturdy materials. This ordinance also contained many specifications for European style homes. For example, all rooms were to have at least one window that measured three-fourths of a square meter, and all toilets were to have flushing mechanisms and covers to contain odors. Although this ordinance was clearer than its predecessor about the requirements for European style construction, it certainly did not make it easier for Africans to live in Zone 1. These requirements increased the cost of these homes and put them out of the financial reach of the majority of Dar es Salaam’s residents.

The era of German colonial rule was interrupted by, and ultimately ended by, World War I. At the conclusion of the war, the Treaty of Versailles stripped Germany of its colonial possessions. The League of Nations Covenant mandated Tanganyika, formerly German East Africa, to Great Britain. This Mandate gave Britain sovereign rights over Tanganyika and charged it with guaranteeing freedom, maintaining order, securing the just treatment of all residents, and promoting the well-being and social progress of all residents.\textsuperscript{18} What is clear from the language of the Mandate is that Britain’s role in Tanganyika concerned development and equality. The Mandate explicitly prohibited segregation and the unequal treatment of races.

Of course the goal of the League of Nations Mandate should not imply that segregation and inequality did not exist in Tanganyika. Not only did the British government maintain and eventually expand the segregation implemented by the German administration, it repeatedly prioritized the needs of the European minority at the expense of the African majority. In fact a 1932 economic report suggested that too much money was spent on the European administration in a place where the needs of Africans were to come first. Placing African needs above those of Europeans was the central tenet of African paramountcy, a policy that originated in Kenya with the Devonshire White Paper of 1923. This paper outlined a way for the British government to answer the “Indian Question.”\textsuperscript{19} The growing Indian population demanded equality with the European population. By officially declaring African needs paramount, the government avoided granting equal rights to all residents of Kenya. Yet as Edward Lumley, a former District Commissioner for Tanganyika, commented, the principle of paramountcy “proved easier to enunciate than to implement.”\textsuperscript{20} These inequalities were especially evident in education. Before the end of World War II, Great Britain increased spending on education in Tanganyika Territory without providing education for Africans, an
omission considered “one of the least fortunate chapters in the history of the country under mandate.” After the war Britain began to spend more on African education, but spending levels remained disparate. A 1955 grant supposedly allotted funding equally between European, Asian, and African education. The vast population differences—21,000 Europeans, 80,000 Asians, and 8 million Africans—meant that African education received much less per person. These examples of education spending clearly show that the League of Nations did not prevent racial segregation or discrimination in Tanganyika in spite of the larger goal of the Mandate.

Although the British occupied Dar es Salaam during World War I, it was not until 1923 that the government officially addressed planning, development, and segregation. In that year the British government enacted a three-zone building ordinance based upon the 1914 German plan; in fact the government translated the ordinance from German into English. Again each zone permitted a certain type of construction. Zone 1 allowed only European style residential buildings, Zone 2 permitted both residential and trading buildings, and Zone 3 allowed “native quarters.” The British administration modified these regulations several times; the most significant change occurred in 1933 when the government altered the description for Zone 3. It substituted the phrase “buildings of any type, subject to the approval of the Authority” for the phrase “native quarters.” This change in wording was significant since it attempted to clarify the purpose of these zones. On multiple occasions the British administration reiterated its position that the zones were not a means of racial segregation. The Chief Secretary said that “it has not been the intention of Government to prevent Natives from building elsewhere than in Zone 3” and the Secretary of the Central Town Planning and Building Committee said that segregated patterns evolved “more or less automatically as the Germans had the same restriction.” Yet on other occasions the administration referred to Zone 3 as the “African Area.” It is impossible for these zones to be simultaneously racially homogenous and not about race at all.

One effect of this wording change was the intrusion of Asians into Zone 3; since the change permitted any type of construction in this area, some Asians took advantage of cheaper housing costs and increased business opportunities in this area. After World War II, the Tanganyika African Government Servants Association complained that Asians occupied all of the well-ventilated and hygienic homes in Kariakoo and were therefore contributing to the housing shortage and poor housing conditions of most of the city’s African residents. Figure 1 illustrates the location of Kariakoo and other neighborhoods within Dar es Salaam. The government was unwilling to stop this movement of Asians; the Provincial Commissioner suggested that since there was “no policy of segregation of race...the compulsory removal of Asians from Zone 3 would conflict with present policy.” Brennan refers to this change as gentrification and suggests it undermined Dar es Salaam’s racial segregation. I suggest that this change actually helped strengthen physical and social segregation and did not bring the improvements often associated with gentrification since living
conditions in Zone 3 stayed poor. Zone 3 remained the only portion of the city that permitted the construction of African style homes, and the government seriously underfunded this zone throughout colonial rule. The change in wording succeeded only in making the building ordinance’s zones seem innocuous and not about race when in fact they continued to facilitate segregation and discrimination. This true emphasis on segregation is apparent in the government’s approach toward Africans living in Zone 1. In fact the Director of Medical Services even expressed his alarm at the number of native style homes built illegally in that area. To solve this problem the administration advocated a separate native village on the Msasani Peninsula to house the servants working at the peninsula’s Zone 1 homes. By having separate African and European areas, the government could not only better enforce building standards but also ensure that Zone 1 remained a segregated area.

Regardless of later attempts to clarify its position, the British administration outlined its approach toward segregation and residential zoning in Dar es Salaam in a 1920 file held at the Tanzania National Archives entitled “Segregation of Races.” The government recognized that an official policy of racial segregation would violate the League of Nations Mandate but it clearly expressed an interest in implementing such a policy and discovered ways to circumvent the Mandate. The desire to segregate Dar es Salaam was not expressed only by low-level officials. Even the governor of the Tanganyika Territory, Horace Byatt, found segregation appealing:

So far as segregation is concerned it is pretty clear to me that in this Territory we cannot adopt the principle of racial segregation as such, for that would lead us into a position (e.g. with the sale of enemy properties) where we should be in conflict with the terms of the Treaty and the Mandate. There is universal agreement as to the wisdom and necessity of segregation except on the part of the Indian agitator, and he objects solely because objection is a political maneuver. But we can, I believe, ensure proper segregation in actual practice by means of Building and Township Regulations. For example, though an Asiatic may buy a plot in the European residential quarter, we can require him to build on it a house of a type which would not suit his methods of life in that we should prohibit the existence of the Asiatic conception of a latrine....

Certainly, as this quotation suggests, racial difference was a primary factor in why the British government segregated Dar es Salaam. Effectively the government achieved its goal by basing its building ordinance on racist assumptions. It assumed that only a European would want a flush toilet and that Africans were incapable of maintaining any structure other than a hut. Although these sanitation preferences could be linked to class, the government used racial categories when discussing these issues, suggesting its interests were in racial segregation rather than economic segregation.
Social segregation in Dar es Salaam

Not only was Dar es Salaam divided into racial zones—albeit without any formal policy of racial segregation—the government treated residents of each zone, and thus members of each race, rather differently. The British administration provided official housing in all three zones since Asians and Africans worked for the government alongside European colonial officials. Yet the estimated cost for each type of house varied considerably. In the post-World War II period, construction costs per home were £1650 for the European Quarter, £500 for the Asian Quarter, and £75 for the African Quarter. The discrepancy in construction expenditures suggests a wide difference in housing quality. More than just the actual structures, there were also vast inequalities in service provision between the zones. In the mid-1940s Zone 3 had no water-borne sewage; water was only available at sixteen public kiosks, fourteen of which were located in Kariakoo; Zone 3 contained just twenty-four street lights, all located in Kariakoo. In spite of this concentration of services in Kariakoo, in 1957 less than twenty-five percent of the city’s African population lived there. This lack of service provision occurred even though African residents contributed a significant amount of money to the city in the form of poll taxes, house taxes, liquor licenses, market receipts, trade licenses, and water sales. In spite of this large revenue, African neighborhoods saw little or no improvement. Not surprisingly these residents expressed their displeasure with their inferior place in the city. Dar es Salaam’s District Officer understood these feelings and sympathized with the African population but his primary concern seemed to be the political implications of this racial inequality:

As a personal opinion, the present system is unsatisfactory. In twenty-five years, we have nothing to show and we cannot have any pride in our past record. We have made numerous promises but they have come to naught. The local Africans are becoming increasingly vocal and increasingly antagonistic to the apathy with which they feel that Government treats their problems. They may not understand the full implications, it is true, but when they see the meanest street in Zone 1 and 2 is constructed of tar macadam and even their main streets left almost untouched, they are convinced that the present system means benefits for the European and Asian at their expense. Their point of view may be wrong but it exists and it is growing. It is a problem that demands a solution, if cynicism is not to become open hostility.

In light of these comments, it is interesting that the same government official suggested making portions of Zone 3 independent from the rest of Dar es Salaam. He based this suggestion on the fact that previous urban development schemes have “failed and instead of people with some degree of civic consciousness, everywhere one finds the urban African pop-
ulations steeped in poverty, crime and filth.”38 Without significant investment in infrastructure and services, it was unlikely that the African areas of Dar es Salaam would have experienced any different outcome.

In addition to directly contributing tax revenues, African residents indirectly funded the government through their Native Beer Hall. All profits from this establishment were funneled into the Territory’s general fund rather than being earmarked specifically for Zone 3. Governor Donald Kennedy indicated in 1939 that it was a “pity” that the profits from the Native Beer Hall could not be used to provide “real amenities” for Africans.39 Other colonial officials shared the sentiment that Africans received few benefits in Tanganyika; one suggested that “surely the native town deserves something, when officials, who pay no rates, have their hedges cut and their drives graveled for nothing.”40 This comment shows that British officials had diverse views about segregation; although this diversity does complicate the practice of racial segregation, importantly any sympathy did not translate into the actual provision of services. These officials viewed the problem of Dar es Salaam in simple terms: “It has been governed for years by gentlemen the interests of the majority of whom have been confined exclusively to the non-native commercial and residential areas, with the result that the native areas have been sadly neglected.” 41 This neglect occurred even though Africans comprised the majority of Dar es Salaam’s population—over seventy percent in 1942.42

**British segregation in practice**

Although both the German and British colonial governments implemented building ordinances to segregate Dar es Salaam, the degree of implementation varied. The German government planned Dar es Salaam as a segregated city, but the outbreak of World War I interrupted the full realization of this plan. On the other hand, the British administration had nearly forty years to strengthen and expand the segregation begun by the Germans. It did so through deliberate actions that kept Europeans, Asians, and Africans physically and socially separate; by differentiating among the three zones in terms of housing and amenities, the government ensured that Dar es Salaam remained a city of three colors. In this paper I divide British segregation into two periods, using 1940 as the dividing line. The following paragraphs outline the significance of that year before turning to the actual practice of segregation.

British colonial policy shifted in 1940 with the implementation of what Iliffe referred to as “new colonialism.”43 The cornerstone of this new policy was the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which financed long-term development plans in British colonies. This Act was not the first attempt by the British government to bring development to its colonies, but it was the first to include a social welfare component. During the 1930s, public knowledge of social and economic conditions in colonies increased, coinciding with worsening conditions created by the global depression. The government realized that if its inadequate policies toward develop-
ment, especially paltry spending on education and other social services, were to continue, Britain’s image as a colonial power would suffer. The ultimate goal of the Act was to limit criticism of Britain’s colonial empire without weakening the country through expanded development funding. Thus this shift in colonial mentality occurred for both pragmatic and humanitarian reasons. Gerald Clauson, the head of the new Social Services Department, saw two motives behind this Act; the first was “a desire to avert possible trouble in certain Colonies, where disturbances are feared if something is not done to improve the lot of the people, the other a desire to impress this country and the world at large with our consciousness of our duties as a great Colonial Power.” Achieving these dual goals required expanding the concept of development to include social progress alongside economic improvement. The outbreak of World War II, however, meant that funding for this expanded view never approached proposed levels. The ultimate reality of this Act was that it provided a new means to justify colonial rule. Thus like using construction standards to achieve racial segregation, this policy of development was a backdoor way to maintain the British Colonial Empire. Although it did bring some increased levels of development, the results were far from spectacular and actually helped reinforce racial segregation and discrimination in Dar es Salaam.

In spite of any changes initiated by the 1940 Act, the broad approach toward each zone remained fairly consistent under British rule. In Zone 1 the government focused on providing adequate standards of housing. British colonial officials expected and demanded high-quality housing, both in size and services. In Zone 3 the administration focused its attention on the quantity of home construction, with little regard to standard or amenities. After 1940 the government did increase service provision there, but the amount never approached the level provided to Zone 1. The approach toward Zone 2 differed significantly. Rather than showing concern over housing, in terms of either quantity or quality, the government focused its attention on criticizing the general state of the zone. Colonial rhetoric toward the Asian population centered on the dirt, filth, and squalor of their living areas, even calling them a “disgrace” to Dar es Salaam. This lack of attention is a direct result of African paramountcy; this policy did not provide for the needs of Asians. They were largely ignored in Dar es Salaam even though the Asian population always significantly outnumbered the European population.

1923-1939: housing Dar es Salaam’s growing population

From 1919 until 1921 the government primarily concerned itself with attempting to “adjust past mistakes,” specifically the haphazard appropriation of plots to natives by the German administration. This adjustment was largely achieved through the requirement of permits for new construction or repairs made on existing buildings. These permits were regularly denied for Africans living in Zones 1 and 2, and in 1920 the gov-
ernment forbade Africans living in those areas to make improvements to their homes.\textsuperscript{50} Thus when their homes fell into disrepair, the government could demolish them on the grounds that they were unfit for human habitation.\textsuperscript{51} By denying these permits, the government successfully controlled the appearance of the zones and succeeded in increasing racial segregation. In the absence of a formal policy of segregation, the government could not forcibly move a resident based solely on his or her race. It could, however, deny permits and force a person to move from an illegal or uninhabitable home. Through this process of selectively denying permits to Africans, the government was in fact beginning its unofficial policy of racial segregation.

By 1921 the government began to pay more attention to the existing native zone, specifically concerning its drainage.\textsuperscript{52} The area had always suffered from drainage problems but the government had not previously proposed any repairs to the system. This lack of attention was not financial since the government collected sufficient tax revenue from Zone 3 but rather was a case of the European area having a higher priority. Eventually the government constructed a drainage system in Zone 3, but in 1924, just two years after its completion, the District Officer complained that the system was “most unsatisfactory and objectionable.”\textsuperscript{53} This drainage example demonstrates that even when Zone 3 received services, they were not necessarily of high quality nor did they offer much lasting benefit to the population. Likewise the provision of services to the African area was not always altruistic. In 1923 the government opened a new market in Kariakoo and relocated native cooked food and petty trading stalls to the old market, activities that had previously been scattered about the streets in a very unsatisfactory way.\textsuperscript{54} This new market, while beneficial to Africans, also served the government’s underlying interest to clean up the city and instill greater order and control. The government also tended to assign blame rather than address problems of service provision. The lack of adequate transport explained poor sanitation and the citywide water supply shortage explained the lack of water in Zone 3. Since the problem was widespread, the government refused to increase the number of public water pipes in African areas until it found a permanent city solution. Still, in spite of these problems, the government declared in its 1927 Annual Report that wonderful progress was being made in Zone 3.\textsuperscript{55} Of course since these reports were written for a British audience, it is important to take this notion of progress with a grain of salt. Still attempts were made to provide housing for the rapidly increasing African population. At first the government allocated trading plots as residential plots, and in 1923 it began to expand the existing native quarter in Kariakoo. Through this expansion, the government was able to steadily increase the number of plots available in Zone 3.\textsuperscript{56} Even with this increase, the continued in-migration to Dar es Salaam meant that the shortage was never fully resolved. From 1921 until 1957, the city’s African population increased from 20,000 to 94,000.\textsuperscript{57}

In 1926 Zone 1 suffered a severe shortage of appropriate housing,
leaving railway officials homeless. Although the government owned several oceanfront lots, it refused to allocate them to these low-level workers. Rather than build on these plots, the Central Town Planning and Building Committee recommended reserving them for future use and to acquire new land for additional European housing. In 1927 it proposed the construction of a new European suburb on the Msasani Peninsula. To fund this construction, the Acting Governor proposed leasing those reserved oceanfront lots. Not surprisingly the Treasurer questioned the logic of this recommendation and proposed to instead make use of the existing plots rather than locate a new suburb far from government offices, shops, and markets. The planning committee ignored this advice, and by 1931 the Oyster Bay suburb on the Msasani Peninsula contained forty-four homes all of which were designated part of Zone 1. Just two years later, the government recognized the difficulty of living in Oyster Bay, far from city amenities—the same concerns raised previously by the Treasurer. To ease these difficulties the government constructed a shop to sell eggs, vegetables, milk, and petrol. The needs, comfort, and convenience of Europeans were the government’s top priority.

John Pashen, the Government Architect, made Asian housing a central part of his 1929 Town Planning Scheme. His plan proposed to create the Upanga residential area, designed to “provide a necessary social outlet for the better plan [sic] Indian population.” Governor Kennedy agreed with Pashen, suggesting that Upanga was where the better-class Indian population will find a social outlet if given the opportunity; if the opportunity is not afforded, it will endeavor to penetrate the areas which we have decided should be kept as far as possible for persons of a different standard of living: for example, Sea View and Oyster Bay.

Although the emphasis of segregation policies was often in separating Europeans and Africans, the administration also expressed an interest in separating Europeans from Asians. The government felt it was important to provide a place for Asians, especially since it considered their living conditions scandalous and often worse than slums in London. Unfortunately these concerns did not translate into increased funding for improvements to Zone 2 or the construction of additional homes. By 1938 the government had yet to take action on Pashen’s plan for Upanga. Even though government rhetoric focused on improving Zone 2, that area was not a priority for urban planning.

The British government’s approach to urban development prior to 1940 can be characterized as one of housing provision. For Europeans the government focused on high-class accommodations while it gave little concern to the housing standards of Africans. In fact the government struggled continuously to house the native population and to provide it with minimal social services. When development policies did affect Africans, they saw few lasting improvements to their living situation in Zone 3.
Asians the government was primarily concerned with keeping them out of European areas. In the absence of an official racial segregation policy, the British government was extremely successful in dividing Dar es Salaam.

1940-1961: bringing development to Dar es Salaam

If the period until 1940 was characterized by housing shortages and a general lack of development in Dar es Salaam, that year’s implementation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act marked a turning point in the government’s ideology. This does not mean that the government succeeded in developing the city evenly or that it always prioritized the development of all citizens. Rather from this year forward, the administration at least considered the well-being of all Dar es Salaam residents, not just Europeans. The Act did bring development to Dar es Salaam, especially urban infrastructure such as roads, housing, water, electricity, and sewage, and social infrastructure such as schools and health clinics. This development, however, like all colonial urban policy preceding it, was based on race. After World War II, 4 million pounds were spent on European housing while 1.6 million pounds were spent on African housing. Zone 2 continued to be ignored since the focus of the Act was not on Asian housing or development.

The year 1942 marked the proposal of a program for the development of Dar es Salaam. The Municipal Secretary recommended a series of improvements for the entire city, including the “improved distribution of water in the Native areas” through the provision of twenty water kiosks in Kariakoo and Ilala. In 1944 the government proposed additional development efforts. The Divisional Engineer recommended an increase in road expenditure, but the government did not earmark any funding for African areas “in view of the possibility that the layout may be altered.” Specific recommendations for Kariakoo included more housing, proper drainage, and water-borne sewage. The sewage plans were especially important since no existing sewage infrastructure served Zone 3. Generally officials recognized the need for increased development in Zone 3 but refused to actually set timetables for it. Thus the Act resulted in increased consideration of development for Africans but did not bring substantial changes to Zone 3.

In 1944 the government enacted a program of model native housing designed to address both the housing shortage and the need for development. The Advisory Committee for Model Native Houses recommended the construction of a model village of thirty-four homes. The goal was for these homes to be better constructed than the typical homes in Zone 3. They would therefore appeal to a higher class resident, a limitation that sparked a larger debate about the benefits of a model village. Many officials thought that it was more important, and more urgent, to provide housing for the poor. At the time, the committee estimated that more than 15,000 Africans required housing; a village of thirty-four homes was insignificant. In spite of any reservations toward this model housing
village, its construction went ahead as originally planned. Even though the poorest Africans had salaries of only thirty shillings per month, rents in the model village were between ten and fifteen shillings per month. Although the intent of this model village was to improve the standard of living for Africans, these high monthly rents prevented those African with the most pressing need for housing from living there. This policy of model housing was not exclusive to Tanganyika; the British government implemented similar schemes elsewhere, and they were as unsuccessful and inappropriate as in Dar es Salaam.

Not only did the model village provide insufficient housing, but by sanctioning its construction the government was unable to construct temporary homes simultaneously to alleviate the shortage. Eventually the government agreed to consider temporary African housing, which it already provided for Europeans. Yet by 1948, Africans living in these temporary homes complained that the latrines were full, the kitchens were too small, the poor construction allowed in rain and thieves, and there were no shopping facilities nearby. This trend of providing few benefits to Africans continued throughout British rule. In 1953 the majority of African homes in the Magomeni area did not have a bathroom or latrine. More so, this area had over 10,000 residents and only one public water point. The government again assigned blame rather than taking action, saying that the lack of funding for the construction of water mains prevented water provision.

Providing adequate housing for Europeans continued to be a problem. In 1946 seventy colonial officials were without homes, but plans existed for the construction of only thirty homes. The Public Works Department laid out the necessary plots in Oyster Bay in 1947 but by the end of the year had completed only twelve homes. The government also had problems ensuring that newly constructed homes were of a high standard. The government constructed flats for officials in the Kinondoni area but was unable to provide them with electricity. The growing city demand for electricity forced government officials to prioritize waiting projects; the unoccupied European homes in Kinondoni were higher priority than occupied Asian homes in the Chang’ombe area. In considering the procurement of electrical supplies for these new European homes, the government thought that “if we are not to get supplies before October 1952 for the new houses they clearly cannot be occupied and the position becomes ridiculous.” It was normal not ridiculous, however, for the city’s Asians and Africans to live without electricity.

The British administration placed a greater emphasis on the development of Dar es Salaam after 1940 by attempting to provide more services to its residents. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act did bring improved infrastructure to the city but unfortunately not all residents benefited equally from this policy. Europeans still received the best treatment while Africans often lived without basic amenities. Even when African areas did receive services, their scope and quality were often inferior to services in Zone 1. Although the broad goals of the 1940 Act were to bring
social development to British colonies, Africans in Dar es Salaam saw few significant results from this policy. Instead, through this series of policy actions and in many instances inaction, the government maintained the physical and social separation of Dar es Salaam that created the very need for this Act.

Conclusions

On my trip to Rangi Tatu I saw firsthand the racial divisions in Dar es Salaam. I met one man who complained that many white researchers have passed through Mbagala asking residents about the quality of their lives, but many years later they are still without water and electricity. Why then should he talk to me? What would I do to benefit him? His response was not totally unexpected. He lives in one of Dar es Salaam’s poorest neighborhoods, in an area that has been discriminated against since colonial rule. Even with policies to increase development for Africans, Zone 3 areas still bear the ill-effects of too many years of neglect. After more than forty years of independence in Dar es Salaam, the legacies of colonial racial segregation and inequality are still very much evident. Although the Executive Officer declared in 1932 that there was no discrimination between races in Dar es Salaam, extreme inequalities occurred between the three zones.83

The three zone urban plan implemented first by the German government and later expanded by the British government created stark divisions within the city. What is especially interesting about these divisions is that they occurred without any direct policy of racial segregation. The colonial governments succeeded in segregating Dar es Salaam in the absence of an official state-sanctioned policy and without ever directly addressing the issue of race. As recognized by the British government, official racial segregation was not practicable; instead the British adopted a seemingly innocuous building ordinance in the hope of securing the “same advantages” as racial segregation.84 Few people might find advantages in racial segregation, but the German and British uses of building ordinances certainly created a city of three colors. These three colors were not equal, with Africans comprising the overwhelming majority of Dar es Salaam’s population. In spite of this dominance, the British government still privileged the European minority giving them premium residential plots, better amenities, and more funding. In addition to this inequality, these three colors were at times blurred; the British government was alarmed when native style huts encroached on Oyster Bay’s European suburb but acted quickly to maintain the area’s unofficial racial segregation.

Even when the British government attempted to bring increased development to its colonies, including Tanganyika, not all races and areas of Dar es Salaam benefited equally. The 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act continued to allocate more money for European housing than African housing in spite of large population disparities. Although colonial policy supposedly prioritized the rights of Africans, they never fully
benefited from the policy of African paramountcy. In 1952 officials refused to let Europeans live in homes without electricity. Yet for African residents in Ilala, it was not until 1954 that the government finally suggested wiring their homes for electricity; it did not consider actually providing those homes with power until the following year. In light of these inequalities, it is no wonder that Dar es Salaam became such a divided city. In 1891, a building ordinance created zones within the city and for seventy years these zones were treated differently. To call Dar es Salaam *Mji wa Rangi Tatu* is not a compliment on the city’s diversity or cosmopolitanism; it is a recognition of its history of racial segregation and discrimination.

**Notes**


17. TNA G 7/18 /July 1, 1914.


23. TNA Laws of the Tanganyika Territory/1928/CAP. 29.

24. TNA 11150, Volume 2/Letter to Chief Secretary from Secretary Central Town Planning and Building Committee/September 28, 1932.

25. TNA 11150, Volume 2/Handwritten Note on the Letter to Chief Secretary from Secretary Central Town Planning and Building Committee/September 28, 1932.


28. TNA 32982/Letter from Provincial Commissioner/March 2, 1945.


30. TNA 26179/Director Medical Services to Chief Secretary/June 17, 1938.

31. TNA 26179/Secretary CTPBC to Acting Chief Secretary/March 23, 1938.

32. TNA AB 616.

33. TNA AB 616/Note to C.S. from H.A.B./December 22, 1920.

34. TNA 33258/Copy of Minute 71 from file 34209.

35. TNA 33024/Development of African Areas of Dar es Salaam Township/District Officer/1944.


38. Ibid.

39. TNA 26602/Note to Acting Secretary from Donald Kennedy/January 18, 1939.

40. TNA 26602/Note to Finance Secretary/January 31, 1939.

41. TNA 26602/Note to Acting Secretary/December 20, 1940.

42. TNA Acc 540 18/4/Population Census/July 15, 1942.
47. TNA 13483, Volume 1/Comments to S.F. about Town Planning Scheme/June 6, 1938.
49. TNA 12589, Volume 1/Notes on Plots in Zone 3 of Dar es Salaam Town-
ship/Requested by Acting Chief Secretary following May 18, 1931 Meeting.
52. Annual Report on Dar es Salaam District for 1921. Shelved in Reading Room, TNA.
53. Annual Report on Dar es Salaam District for 1924. Shelved in Reading Room, TNA.
56. *Ibid*.
58. TNA Acc. 189, 96I/Central Town Planning and Building Committee Meeting/May 31, 1926.
60. TNA Acc. 189, 96I/Central Town Planning and Building Committee Meeting/April 7, 1933.
61. TNA Acc. 189, 96I/Central Town Planning and Building Committee Meeting/ April 7, 1933.
62. TNA 26160/ Town Planning Scheme/1929.
63. TNA 13483, Volume 1/Notes to Chief Secretary/February 14, 1938.
64. Annual Report on Dar es Salaam District for 1929. Shelved in Reading Room, TNA.
66. *Ibid*.
67. TNA Acc. 61 643/3/Notes on the Development of Dar es Salaam Town-
ship/Municipal Secretary/January 1942.
68. *Ibid*.
69. TNA 33024/Note from Divisional Engineer to Chairman Township Development Committee/June 21, 1944.
70. TNA 33024/Minutes of 3rd Meeting of Township Development Sub-Commit-
tee/June 19, 1944.
71. TNA Acc. 540 27/19/Meeting of Advisory Committee for Model Native Houses/May 5, 1944.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
75. TNA 32982/Letter from R.A.J. Maguire, Chief Secretary to the Government/June 6, 1945.
76. TNA Acc. 540 27/19/Meeting Minutes/September 14, 1948.
77. TNA 540 27/19/Letter/December 19, 1953.
78. TNA 540 27/19/Letter/March 4, 1954.
79. TNA 35152/December 30, 1946.
80. TNA 35152/July 1, 1947.
81. TNA 31662/Note to S.F. from M.D.W./2 November, 1951.
82. TNA 31662/Note to M.F.T.E. from M.D.W./2 October, 1951.
83. TNA 18950, Volume 1/Letter to Provincial Commission from Executive Officer/April 15, 1932.
84. TNA AB 616/Note to H.E. from A.C.H./December 22, 1920.